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CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Christopher S. Dadak *
INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes the past year of Supreme Court of Virginia
opinions, revisions to the Virginia Code, and Rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia affecting Virginia civil procedure.1 It is not fully
comprehensive but does endeavor to highlight changes and relevant analysis regarding Virginia civil procedure. The summarized
cases do not reflect all changes in Virginia jurisprudence on civil
procedure and, at times, focus on emphasized reminders from the
court on issues it analyzed. The Article first addresses opinions of
the supreme court, then new legislation enacted during the 2019
General Assembly Session, and, finally, approved revisions to the
Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
I. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Craving Oyer
The Supreme Court of Virginia issued an opinion that provided
useful guidance on the use and application of motions craving oyer.
A landowner in Alexandria appealed the “decision of the [Alexandria] City Council in a land-use case.”2 Because the substance of
the land-use issue is not necessary for the procedural analysis, the
author provides only a brief factual summary. The landowner was

* Associate, Guynn, Waddell, Carroll, & Lockaby, P.C., Salem, Virginia. J.D., 2012,
University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2008, Washington and Lee University.
The author thanks the University of Richmond Law Review editors and staff for
their dedication and meticulous work despite the pandemic’s disruption to everyone’s personal and professional lives.
1. Due to the publishing schedule, the relevant “year” is approximately July 2019
through July 2020.
2. Byrne v. City of Alexandria, __ Va. __, 842 S.E.2d 409, 410 (2020).
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renovating property in an historic district that had a board of architectural review.3 His plans were all properly approved, but he
neglected to include in any of his documentation that his work
would entail the destruction of the existing fence in front of the
property.4 He was issued a violation for “fail[ing] to obtain the approval prerequisite to the demolition and replacement of the
fence.”5 The landowner submitted the plans for the replacement
fence, and the plan was all approved except for the size of the gate.
He requested eight-foot width but was only approved for six.6
The landowner appealed the architectural board’s restriction on
the size of the gate to city council.7 The council held a public hearing on the issue and “unanimously affirmed the decision of the [architectural board].”8 The landowner appealed to the Alexandria
City Circuit Court, alleging the decision was “arbitrary, capricious,
contrary to law and constituted an abuse of discretion.”9 The city
“filed a demurrer and a motion craving oyer of the legislative record that had been before the [council] when it made its decision.”10
The court granted the motion, reviewed the entire legislative record once it was filed, “issued a letter opinion sustaining the demurrer,” and then “entered a final order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissing [the landowner’s] petition with
prejudice.”11 The landowner appealed on two assignments of error;
the germane one to this article argued “that the circuit court erred
in granting the City’s motion craving oyer.”12 The supreme court
granted the writ.13
The supreme court, as it often does, began with an historical
analysis of the origins of such a motion. It noted that “[t]he word
‘oyer’ is of Norman French origin and means ‘to hear,’” which is
particularly appropriate because the “motion . . . originated in the
early years of the English common law when many litigants were
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 410.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 410.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 410.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 411.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 411.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 411.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 411.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 411.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 411.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 411.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 411.
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illiterate.”14 The motion would allow “a defendant, sued on a claim
based on a written document, to have the document produced in
court and read aloud to him.”15 The motion evolved over time, but
not “in an orderly progression.”16 Originally, it only applied to
“deeds, writs, bonds, letters of probate and administration and
other ‘specialties’ (referring to documents under seal).”17 Throughout the nineteenth century, the supreme court expanded it to include documents related to recognizance, acts of the General Assembly, appellate record, arbitration award, criminal court pleas,
and construction contracts.18
The landowner relied on language in Langhorne v. Richmond
Railway Co., where the supreme court noted “crav[ing] oyer of papers mentioned in a pleading applies, as a general rule, only to
deeds and letters of probate and administration, not to other writings.”19 The supreme court noted that this sentence was dicta and
“failed to take account of the cases . . . that had, for over a century,
expanded the availability of oyer to obtain production of a much
wider variety of documents than deeds and letters of probate and
administration.”20 Instead, the supreme court reaffirmed instead
its holding in Culpeper National Bank v. Morris, and quoted its
analysis with approval:
No intelligent construction of any writing or record can be made unless all essential parts of such paper or record are produced. A litigant
has no right to put blinkers on the court and attempt to restrict its
vision to only such parts of the record as the litigant thinks tend to
support his view. When a court is asked to make a ruling on any paper
or record, it is its duty to require the pleader to produce all material
parts.21

14. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 411.
15. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 411 (first citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*299; and then citing 4 JOHN B. MINOR, INSTITUTES OF COMMON AND STATUTE LAW 732–33
(3d ed. 1893)).
16. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 411.
17. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 411 (first citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*299; and then citing Specialty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968)).
18. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 411–12 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 412 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Langhorne
v. Richmond Ry. Co., 91 Va. 369, 372, 22 S.E. 159, 159 (1895)).
20. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 412.
21. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 412–13 (quoting Culpeper Nat’l Bank v. Morris, 168 Va. 379,
382–83, 191 S.E. 764, 765 (1937)).
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The supreme court declined to put blinders on itself or future
courts and affirmed the circuit court’s granting of the motion craving oyer. This decision supports the strength and usefulness of motions craving oyer, particularly in contractual or land-use cases. As
happened in this case (and for the purpose the supreme court noted
the motion was created), motions craving oyer can streamline litigation and greatly reduce its expense.
B. Tolling of Statute of Limitations
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled on an issue of first impression, whether Virginia Code section 8.01-229(D) can toll the statute
of limitations for obstructive acts that occur prior to the accrual of
the cause of action. The case also involved lawyer misconduct.
In 1987, Nelson Mackey (“Mackey”) joined as a partner the firm
of “Dodson, Pence, Viar, Young & Woodrum.”22 In 1995, disagreements regarding compensation arose and Mackey left the firm.23
The remaining partners formed a new firm of “Dodson, Pence, &
Viar” but “[n]o formal winding up of the partnership or accounting
of partnership assets occurred upon Mackey’s departure.”24 The
firm, before, during, and after Mackey’s involvement, maintained
health insurance through Trigon Health Care, Inc. (“Trigon”).25 “In
1997, Trigon demutualized and became a stock insurance company” during which process it “issued . . . shares in the name of
Dodson, Pence, Viar, Woodrum, & Mackey even though the partnership purchasing insurance coverage at that time was Dodson,
Pence, & Viar.”26 Over time and through subsequent mergers and
stock-splits, the number of shares significantly increased and even
earned “approximately $20,000 cash in merger consideration.”27
“Pence passed away in 1999 and Dodson followed in 2001,”28
both presumably unaware of the stocks and merger consideration.
In 2002, Viar, who was already in poor health, wrote a letter to the
bank to “inquire regarding ‘some shares of Trigon stock registered
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Mackey v. McDannald, __ Va. __, 842 S.E.2d 379, 382 (2020).
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 382.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 382.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 382.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 382.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 382.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 382.
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in the name of Dodson, Pence, Viar, Woodrum & Mackey, a law
partnership dissolved years ago’ that he learned may exist from a
recent proxy statement.”29 In July 2002, the bank responded confirming the existence of the stock and providing an estimated value
of around $64,000.30 Viar passed away that October without “further action” regarding the shares or merger consideration.31
Later in 2002, Viar’s assistant “came across documents relating
to the Trigon stock” and contacted Mackey, who came and picked
up the documents, including Viar’s communication with the
bank.32 Mackey did not let the executors of his former partners’
estates know of the stock; instead he “changed the mailing address
for Dodson, Pence, Viar, Woodrum & Mackey to his residential address.”33
A former associate attorney of Viar assisted the executor of his
estate on “various tax matters” related to the estate.34 While he
found Viar’s letter to the bank, he did not find the bank’s response
confirming the existence of the stock and its value.35 The former
associate asked Mackey about the stock and indicated that he was
helping the executor.36 Mackey sent him an email indicating that
replacement certificates, based on the number of shares, would
only be worth $1,413.81.37 In late 2003, Mackey told Quinn38 that
he had “looked into it” and “[t]here was not enough money involved.”39 “Quinn understood this . . . as meaning that ‘the stock
had no value, and should really have been of no financial interest
to [the executor].’”40 Quinn, although admittedly having “enough
information to look into the stock value himself,” did not do so “because ‘[he] trusted Mr. Mackey’” and simply advised the executor
of Mackey’s indication that there was no value in the stock.41 Based

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 382.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 382.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 382.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 382.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 382.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 382.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 382.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 382.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 383.
Mackey denied this exchange. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 383.
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on this information, the executor “made no efforts to collect the
stock.”42 Quinn did not reach out to the estates of the other partners, Dodd and Pence.43
In 2009, Mackey sent a letter “on ‘Dodson, Pence, Viar, Woodrum & Mackey’ letterhead” which he had “created that included
his home address, phone number, and personal email address” and
directed the stock transfer company “to ‘remit the merger consideration and net sales proceeds payable to Dodson Pence Viar Woodrum Mackey, G. Nelson Mackey, Jr.’ to his home address.”44
Mackey deposited the money and did not inform the estates of his
former partners of the proceeds.45
In 2015, Quinn found and reviewed the letter from the bank to
Viar confirming the stock and its value.46 He then notified the executor of Viar’s estate and “attempted to contact Mackey to no
avail.”47 Quinn contacted the stock transfer company and was advised of the stock value and liquidation in 2009 by Mackey.48 Quinn
notified the other estates of the stock value and liquidation and all
three estates proceeded to file suit against Mackey in November
2015.49
The parties tried the matter in a bench trial and briefed the issue of statute of limitations in written closing statements submitted to the court.50 Mackey argued that “no tolling occurred because
the misrepresentation, if any, was made long before any act creating a cause of action occurred.”51 In a letter opinion, the circuit
court held that Virginia Code section 8.01-229(D) “tolls the limitations period even if no cause of action has accrued at the time of
the misrepresentation. . . .”52 The circuit court further held that
Quinn reasonably relied on Mackey’s statements regarding the

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 383.
Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 383.
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stocks and that “Mackey concealed the stock from ‘each of its rightful owners. . . .’”53 Mackey appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia on the statute of limitations and whether plaintiffs provided
the elements of conversion at trial. This Article addresses only the
statute of limitations analysis.54
“Mackey first argue[d] that Code § 8.01-229(D) does not apply to
toll the statute of limitations in this case because—to the extent he
committed an obstructive act—it occurred long before any cause of
action accrued.”55 The statute of limitations for conversion is five
years56 and “begins to run ‘from the date the injury is sustained in
the case of . . .damage to property.’”57 The conversion occurred in
2009 and the suit was filed six years later in 2015, so absent tolling
of the limitations period the suit would plainly be time-barred.58
Virginia Code section 8.01-229(D) tolls the limitations period
“[w]hen the filing of an action is obstructed by a defendant’s . . .
using any other direct or indirect means to obstruct the filing of an
action. . . .”59
The supreme court noted the unprecedented facts of this case
and that “none of [its] cases have expressly held that an obstructive
act prior to accrual can trigger Code § 8.01-229(D) tolling.”60 The
supreme court reviewed its prior cases analyzing the type of obstructive act that must occur to toll the statute. The act must be
an affirmative act with the intent to obstruct filing, involve moral
turpitude, and actually prevent the filing of the action.61 “Mere silence,” even if misleading or effective, is not sufficient.62 “From
these authorities, it is apparent that the focus of Code § 8.01229(D) is the defendant’s intent, not the timing of the obstructive
53. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 384.
54. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 384.
55. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 384.
56. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 384 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
57. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 384 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(B) (Cum. Supp.
2020)).
58. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 384.
59. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 384–85 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(D) (Cum. Supp.
2020)).
60. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 385.
61. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 385 (first citing Newman v. Walker, 270 Va. 291, 298, 618
S.E.2d 336, 337 (2005); and then citing Grimes v. Suzukawa, 262 Va. 330, 332, 551 S.E.2d
644, 646 (2001)).
62. See id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 385 (citing Culpeper Nat’l Bank v. Tidewater Improvement Co., 119 Va. 73, 83–84, 89 S.E.2d 118, 121 (1916)).
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actions.”63 Therefore, the supreme court held that section 8.01229(D) “tolls the limitations period when a defendant’s obstructive
acts occur before a cause of action accrues, provided the defendant
intended those acts to prevent inquiry, or . . . hinder a discovery of
the cause of action by the use of ordinary diligence.”64
The supreme court ultimately found that Mackey’s statements
to Quinn were sufficient to toll the statute of limitations for Viar’s
estate.65 However, because he had no interactions with the executors of the Dodson and Pence estates, their claims were timebarred.66 The facts of this case, involving alleged misrepresentations by an attorney, certainly had equity leaning in favor of the
estates—of which only one prevailed. The supreme court’s analysis
as to timing of the acts being irrelevant makes sense and aims to
prevent undesirable conduct. However, with dispositive focus on
the intent of alleged obstructive acts, future decisions on this issue
are likely to be highly fact-specific.
C. Contractual Waiver of Statute of Limitations
In 2006, “Foster and Wilson Building, LLC [(the ‘Company’)] executed a promissory note in favor of New South Federal Savings
Bank [(the ‘Bank’)]” for a construction loan.67 The owners of the
Company later signed a written guaranty agreement (the “Contract”) with the Bank personally guaranteeing the promissory note
and agreeing to “waive the benefit of any statute of limitations or
other defenses affecting [its] liability” under the Contract.68 As the
reader can probably guess, the Company ended up defaulting on
the promissory note.69 The Bank issued a notice of default and payment demand to the owner on August 27, 2010.70 The Bank’s assignee (the “Assignee”) filed suit on November 23, 2015, more than
five years after the notice of default.71
63. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 385 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 386 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 387.
66. Id. at __, 842 S.E.2d at 387.
67. Radiance Capital Receivables Fourteen, LLC v. Foster, 298 Va. 14, 18, 833 S.E.2d
867, 868 (2019).
68. Id. at 18, 833 S.E.2d at 868.
69. Id. at 18, 833 S.E.2d at 868.
70. Id. at 18, 833 S.E.2d at 868.
71. Id. at 18, 833 S.E.2d at 868.
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In response to the suit, the owner filed a plea in bar asserting
the statute of limitations.72 Specifically, the owners argued that
their waiver of the statute of limitations defense “was unenforceable because it did not meet the specific requirements of Code § 8.01232.”73 The Assignee argued that the section only applied to promises not to plead the statute of limitations and not waivers such as
the one in the guaranty, and further that “the failure to enforce the
contractual waiver would ‘operate as fraud’ on [the Assignee].”74
The circuit court sustained the plea in bar and dismissed the matter with prejudice, which the Assignee appealed to the Supreme
Court of Virginia.75
The supreme court began its analysis with the requirements of
Virginia Code section 8.01-232. The statute voids written waivers
of the statute of limitations defense only “when (i) it is made to
avoid or defer litigation pending settlement of any case, (ii) it is not
made contemporaneously with any other contract, and (iii) it is
made for an additional term not longer than the applicable limitations period.”76 The supreme court noted that the Contract did not
meet any of the three requirements because the waiver was not
made to avoid or defer litigation, was entered into contemporaneously, and had an indefinite, or permanent, term.77
The supreme court did not find the Assignee’s attempt to distinguish between waivers and promises not to plead the statute of
limitations persuasive. After all, “when a party intentionally relinquishes its known right to plead the statute of limitations through
a contractual waiver, the party implicitly makes a promise that it
will refrain from pleading the statute of limitations in the future.”78
Furthermore, from a practical perspective, if such a distinction existed, “the parties to a contract could circumvent the requirements
of that statute by simply characterizing a promise not [to] plead
the statute of limitations as a contractual waiver[,]” rendering section 8.01-232 meaningless.79

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 18, 833 S.E.2d at 868.
Id. at 18–19, 833 S.E.2d at 868.
Id. at 19, 833 S.E.2d at 868.
Id. at 19, 833 S.E.2d at 868.
Id. at 20, 833 S.E.2d at 869.
Id. at 19, 833 S.E.2d at 869.
Id. at 21, 833 S.E.2d at 869.
Id. at 21, 833 S.E.2d at 869–70.
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The supreme court then analyzed the Assignee’s argument that
a failure to waive the statute of limitations would operate as a
fraud on the Assignee. As an initial matter, the “general rule [is]
that ‘fraud must relate to a present or pre-existing fact, and cannot
ordinarily be predicated on unfulfilled promises or statements as
to future events.’”80 If the party to a contract “makes a promise
that, when made, he has no intention of performing, that promise
is considered a misrepresentation of present fact[—the state of
mind—]and may form the basis for a claim of actual fraud.”81 The
supreme court held that when applied to a contractual waiver of
statute of limitations, “if a party promises not to plead the statute
of limitations without any present intention to be bound by that
promise, the party may be estopped from pleading the statute of
limitations in order to prevent the operation of a fraud on the promisee.”82 However, the supreme court affirmed the circuit court’s
sustaining of the plea in bar because the Assignee’s evidence and
argument in this matter relied solely on the contractual waiver and
failed to show the owners had “fraudulent intent to refuse to be
bound by the statute of limitations waiver. . . .”83
The requirements of Virginia Code section 8.01-232 set an incredibly high bar for the waiver of statute of limitations. The fraud
exception to those requirements is also difficult to achieve. One
must show that, at the time of signing the contract, the party had
fraudulent intent to refuse to abide by the provision of the waiver.
To prevail on the exception would likely require incriminating
party admissions (through documents or testimony) to establish
that subjective mindset existed at the time of signing.
D. Wrongful Death and Claim Splitting
The Supreme Court of Virginia analyzed an interesting scenario
in which plaintiff filed suit in both Virginia and Kentucky, leading
to issues involving remedy election, judicial estoppel, claim splitting, and double recovery. The case involved wrongful death and

80. Id. at 23, 833 S.E.2d at 871 (quoting Soble v. Herman, 175 Va. 489, 500, 9 S.E.2d
459, 464 (1940)).
81. Id. at 23–24, 833 S.E.2d at 871 (quoting SuperValu, Inc. v. Johnson, 276 Va. 356,
368, 666 S.E.2d 335, 342 (2008)).
82. Id. at 24, 833 S.E.2d at 871.
83. Id. at 24, 833 S.E.2d at 871.
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personal injury claims against healthcare providers in Virginia
and Kentucky.84 In May, the decedent was seen in Virginia for nausea, vomiting, and abdominal pain.85 She had an abdominal CT
scan for pancreatic issues, specifically necrosis.86 She was discharged four days later.87 The decedent continued to suffer from
symptoms and the next day was admitted to a hospital in Kentucky.88 She was discharged, but returned a few days later and was
transferred to another hospital.89 The decedent needed multiple
surgeries, suffered significant complications, and sadly passed
away a couple months later.90
In August 2014, the executor filed suit against the Kentucky
healthcare providers “alleg[ing] claims for the decedent’s personal
injury and wrongful death.”91 The executor voluntarily dismissed
the wrongful death claim and ultimately settled and dismissed the
Kentucky suit in July 2017 with prejudice.92
Meanwhile, in August 2015, the executor filed suit against the
Virginia healthcare providers in Virginia circuit court “alleging
wrongful death under Code § 8.01-50 and a survival action for personal injury under Code § 8.01-25.”93 The executor amended the
complaint, removing one defendant and removing the personal injury claim.94 The remaining defendants filed motions to dismiss,
arguing that the Kentucky and Virginia suits “asserted the same
injuries” and that the executor had “already elected his remedy
when he recovered for personal injury to the decedent in Kentucky.”95 The defendants also argued that the executor had impermissibly split his claims and that the Virginia suit was judicially
estopped.96

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Green v. Diagnostic Imaging Assocs., P.C., __ Va. __, 843 S.E.2d 371, 373 (2020).
Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 374.
Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 374.
Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 374.
Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 374.
Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 374.
Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 374.
Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 374.
Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 375.
Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 375.
Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 375.
Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 376.
Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 376.
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The circuit court granted the motions to dismiss. The court held
that Virginia Code section 8.01-56 “requires plaintiffs in Virginia
‘to make an election as to whether they want to recover for personal
injury or wrongful death.’”97 The court found that the executor
elected his remedy by settling the Kentucky suit and “the mere acceptance of the recovery in Kentucky for the same injury does foreclose any later acceptance of a recovery in Virginia for the same
injury.”98 The court also agreed with the defendants that holding
otherwise would allow claim-splitting and double recovery.99 Finally, the court also held that the executor was judicially estopped
from pursuing the Virginia suit.100
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court of Virginia,
“if no evidence has been taken, . . . ‘treat[s] the factual allegations
in the complaint as [it] do[es] on review of a demurrer.”101 It “review[s] the circuit court’s decision to dismiss the complaint as well
as any issues of statutory interpretation, de novo.”102
The supreme court disagreed with the circuit court’s description
of Virginia Code section 8.01-56 “as an election of remedy statute.”103 Instead it held that the statute “plainly states that if the
injured individual’s death resulted from the injury, the action for
that injury must be pursued in a wrongful death suit” and does not
give the plaintiff “the option of maintaining a personal injury action for a decedent’s injury if that injury resulted in the decedent’s
death.”104
“Accordingly, in the instant case, [the executor’s] ability to recover in Virginia for the personal injury or wrongful death of the
decedent was not an ‘election’ [the executor] was required to make

97. Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 376.
98. Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 376.
99. Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 376.
100. Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 376.
101. Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 376 (quoting Bragg v. Bd. of Supervisors, 295 Va. 416, 423,
813 S.E.2d 331, 334 (2018)).
102. Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 376 (citation omitted).
103. Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 377.
104. Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 377.
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under Code § 8.01-56.”105 Nothing in that statute’s language prohibited the executor from settling a personal injury claim in Kentucky and pursuing a wrongful death claim in Virginia.106
The Court also reversed the circuit court as to its holding on
claim-splitting, double recovery, and judicial estoppel. The policy
behind forbidding claim splitting was “protect[ing] a defendant
from vexatious and costly litigation resulting from a multiplicity of
suits on the same cause of action.”107 However, this concern was
inapplicable because the Virginia and Kentucky suits involved different defendants. While the supreme court did agree that the executor could not enjoy double recovery, it “was not a sufficient basis
for dismissing [the executor’s] action; any alleged double recovery
can be addressed by the circuit court.”108 Judicial estoppel did not
apply because, as mentioned above, the parties were not the same
and because resolving a personal injury claim in Kentucky is not
inconsistent with maintaining a wrongful death claim in Virginia.109
II. NEW LEGISLATION
It was a busy and unusual session in the General Assembly with
noteworthy changes in Virginia civil procedure.
A. Appeals from Courts Not of Record
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 16.1-196
regarding appeals from general district court.110 The statute clarifies that an appeal can also be taken “from any order entered or
judgment rendered in a general district court that alters, amends,

105. Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 377–78.
106. Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 378. In fact, “Kentucky law allows the filing of a personal
injury claim in addition to a wrongful death claim for the same injury.” Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d
at 378 (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.133).
107. Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 378 (quoting Flora, Flora & Montague, Inc. v. Saunders, 235
Va. 306, 311, 367 S.E.2d 493, 495 (1988)).
108. Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 379.
109. Id. at __, 843 S.E.2d at 379.
110. Act of Apr. 10, 2020, ch. 1048, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-106 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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overturns, or vacates any prior final order.”111 The language is specific and seems clear that an order denying a motion or action to
amend, overturn, or vacate a prior final order would not subject the
prior final order to an appeal—so such attempts to “game” the finality of an order should not work. In another change, parties may
now essentially “piggyback” on another party’s appeal of a final order or judgment in general district court. The new language states:
If any party timely [and properly] notices an appeal . . . , such notice
of appeal shall be deemed a timely notice of appeal by any other party
on a final order or judgment entered in the same or a related action
arising from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the underlying action.112

The “piggybacking” party must still “timely perfect their own respective appeal[] by giving a bond and the writ tax and costs.”113
This statute in effect overturns an amendment to the Rules of the
Supreme Court of Virginia114 and court cases on the issue115 requiring and holding respectively that each party must timely note its
own appeal.
From a practical perspective this amendment should ease stress
on practitioners in tried general district court cases where parties
are still exploring settlement and particularly in cases involving
multiple defendants. Prior to this change, parties would have to
weigh the odds of another party appealing and consider the need
for pre-emptively filing their own appeal.
B. Filing Copy of Return of Process
Practitioners always welcome changes to make filing simpler,
particularly when it involves allowing copies as opposed to originals. Virginia Code section 8.01-325 now requires the clerk to “accept a photocopy, facsimile, or other copy of the original proof of

111. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-106(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
112. Id. § 16.1-106(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
113. Id.
114. See Order Amending Part Seven B, Rule 7:B12, Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia
(Nov. 1, 2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2020), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendmen
ts/2019_1101_rule_7b_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV3S-KLA2].
115. See Robert & Bertha Robinson Family, LLC v. Allen, 295 Va. 130, 152, 810 S.E.2d
48, 60 (2018); see also Christopher Dadak, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Civil Practice
and Procedure, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 11, 21–30 (2018) (discussing case and its holding that
“piggyback” appeals are not allowed).
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service” as long as “the proponent provides a statement that any
such copy is a true copy of the original.”116 This change goes one
step in the right direction.
C. Notice of Termination of Tenancy
There has been significant upheaval in landlord-tenant matters
during the pandemic, which this article does not cover. From a procedural perspective, it is important to know that Virginia Code section 55.1-1202 now requires any notice of lease termination for a
“tenant receiving tenant-based rental assistance” to include “on its
first page, in type no smaller or less legible than that otherwise
used in the body of the notice, the statewide legal aid telephone
number and website address.”117 Make sure to update your lease
termination forms accordingly.
D. Board of Zoning Appeals Response
Petitions for a writ of certiorari to circuit court appealing a board
of zoning appeals decision are a creature of statute and fairly procedural in nature. Virginia Code section 15.2-2314 has been
amended to specify that, upon service, “the board of zoning appeals
shall have 21 days or as ordered by the court to respond.”118 This
amended language is a bit confusing, as the board of zoning appeals is not considered a party to the action but “shall participate
in the proceedings to the extent required by this section.”119 Local
government practitioners must be wary of this new deadline.
E. Newspaper Advertising for Planning District 23
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 15.2-2204
to loosen publication requirements for localities in Planning District 23.120 For those localities, if “the newspaper fails to publish
the notice, such locality shall be deemed to have met the notice

116. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-325(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
117. Id. § 55.1-1202(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
118. Id. § 15.2-2314 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
119. Id.
120. Act of Mar. 2, 2020, ch. 22, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2204(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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requirements of this subsection so long as the notice was published
in the next available edition of a newspaper having general circulation in the locality.”121 Planning District 23 encompasses the following localities: Gloucester County, Isle of Wight County, James
City County, Southampton County, Surry County, York County,
City of Chesapeake, City of Franklin, City of Hampton, City of
Newport News, City of Norfolk, City of Poquoson, City of Portsmouth, City of Suffolk, City of Virginia Beach, and City of Williamsburg.122
F. Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts
Following changes in the 2019 General Assembly session which
amended Virginia Code sections 8.01-195.4 and 16.1-77,123 the
2020 session of the General Assembly also amended Virginia Code
section 17.1-513 (jurisdiction of circuit courts) to allow a plaintiff
to move to decrease the ad damnum and transfer the matter to
general district court.124 This motion prevents the plaintiff from
having to suffer a nonsuit or voluntary dismissal without prejudice
and the “tolling of the applicable statutes of limitations governing
the pending matter shall be unaffected by the transfer.”125 The motion must be made at least ten days before trial and the plaintiff is
still responsible for paying filing and other fees in general district
court.126 The author remains skeptical that these changes were
necessary given that the plaintiff already enjoys the benefit of getting to choose the venue and always has the option of a nonsuit.127
Furthermore, parties can always agree to proceed with a bench
trial in front of a judge, instead of a full jury trial. However, this

121. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2204(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
122. VA. ASS’N OF PLANNING DIST. COMM’NS, PLANNING DISTRICT COMMISSIONS 415–16,
https://www.commonwealth.virginia.gov/media/governorvirginiagov/secretary-of-the-comm
onwealth/pdf/bluebooks/2014/Planning-Districts.pdf [https://perma.cc/X85N-32KZ].
123. Act of Mar. 22, 2020, ch. 787, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-195.4, 16.1-77 (Cum. Supp. 2020)) (allowing a plaintiff to amend the ad damnum and transfer a case between circuit court and general district court).
124. Act of Apr. 9, 2020, ch. 903, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 17.1-513 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-513 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
126. Id.
127. See Christopher Dadak, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Civil Practice and Procedure, 54 U. RICH. L. REV. 7, 24–26 (2019) (discussing last year’s changes).
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amendment should hopefully benefit cases that have stalled in circuit court and, for a variety of potential reasons, may not be worth
the expense of further circuit court litigation.
G. Signatures on Pleadings
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 8.01-27.1
and increased restrictions as to signatures on pleadings.128 The
statute specifies that pleadings must be signed by the attorney of
record “who is an active member in good standing of the Virginia
State Bar.”129 The statute clarifies that a “signature of a person
other than counsel of record who is an active member in good
standing of the Virginia State Bar . . . is not a valid signature.”130
This change seems to forbid the practice of attorneys authorizing
other individuals (generally other attorneys in their firm) to sign
pleadings on their behalf. This change may be a bit cumbersome
for lawyers during the COVID-19 pandemic, as lawyers may be
working remotely and away from staff. However, in the long run
this change should not be difficult for lawyers to comply with and
is likely to be superseded by electronic signatures and e-filing anyway.
While the signature defect “renders the pleading, motion, or
other paper voidable,” a party has twenty-one days to cure the defect once it has been “brought to the[ir] attention” and the cured
pleading “shall be valid and relate back to the date it was originally
served or filed.”131 So if you are stuck in a situation where you cannot sign a pleading, you are still better off authorizing someone
else (although this is technically defective) than sending a nonoriginal signature to the clerk’s office where it is likely to be rejected and not filed.
H. Attorney Fees Paid from Court
Virginia Code section 54.1-3933 has been amended regarding
the notice required when an attorney wants to be compensated out
128. Act of Mar. 2, 2020, ch. 74, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
129. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
130. Id.
131. Id. § 8.01-271.1(A), (G) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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of funds “under the control of the court.”132 The General Assembly
deleted the language allowing such funds to be disbursed if “the
parties are notified in writing that application will be made to the
court for such decree or order.”133 This deletion means attorneys
must provide notice after filing the request and can no longer provide written notice prior to the filing.
I. Interlocutory Appeals
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 8.01670.1, significantly increasing the viability of interlocutory appeals.134 The statute now allows a party at any time prior to trial
in circuit court to file a motion asking to “certify such order or decree for interlocutory appeal.”135 The most significant change in reviewing such motions is that the requirement that the parties be
in agreement for the interlocutory appeal has been deleted.136 In
practical terms that requirement seriously restricted the opportunity to seek an interlocutory appeal. Now, “[i]f the request for
certification is opposed by any party, the parties may brief the motion in accordance with the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.”137 Additionally, a party now has fifteen days after the motion is granted to file the petition in the appropriate appellate
court.138
Interlocutory appeals for sovereign, absolute, or qualified immunity issues have been expanded to almost the status of a matter
of right. If the circuit court grants or denies on a plea based on such
immunity “that, if granted, would immunize the movant from compulsory participation in the proceeding, the order is eligible for immediate appellate review.”139 Notably, instead of filing a motion
with the circuit court for interlocutory appeal, one immediately

132. Id. § 54.1-3933 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
133. Act of Mar. 3, 2020, ch. 112, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-3933 (Cum. Supp. 2020)) (emphasis added).
134. Act of Apr. 9, 2020, ch. 907, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-670.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-670.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
136. Ch. 907, 2020 Va. Acts at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-670.1
(Cum. Supp. 2020)).
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-670.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
138. Id.
139. Id. § 8.01-670.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020) (emphasis added).
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files a petition on this issue directly with the appellate court.140
However, such an appeal does not stay the matter in circuit court
unless “(i) the petition or appeal could be dispositive of the entire
civil action or (ii) there exists good cause, other than the pending
petition or appeal, to stay the proceedings.”141 Importantly, the failure to seek interlocutory appeal or the failure to succeed on such
motion does not waive the appeal or prevent a party from appealing after a final order, “unless the order denying such interlocutory
review provides for such preclusion.”142
III. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
There have been relevant amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia over the past year.
A. Use of Depositions for Summary Judgment
The Supreme Court of Virginia amended Rule 3:20 regarding
summary judgment. The amendment added a sentence stating, “As
further provided in subsection C of § 8.01-420, depositions and affidavits may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary
judgment in any action where the only parties to the action are
business entities and the amount at issue is $50,000 or more.”143
As the new language makes clear, it reflects the change in the Virginia Code allowing for the use of depositions for summary judgment in cases involving only businesses and with a value exceeding
$50,000.144 The new rule now matches the statutory provision. Like
the statute, the rule is a step in the right direction to streamline
litigation and hopefully lower fees and expenses for parties involved. However, a friendly reminder that you may also use deposition transcripts to support a motion for summary judgment if the

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id. § 8.01-670.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 8.01-670.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:20 (Repl. Vol. 2020).
Id.
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parties agree,145 to dismiss a claim for punitive damages (except
for driving while impaired),146 or if the other side fails to object.147
B. Use of Depositions at Trial
The Supreme Court of Virginia amended the uniform pretrial
scheduling order regarding the designation of deposition testimony
at trial.148 The form now requires parties to designate deposition
testimony at least thirty days before trial.149 The order now specifies that it is “the obligation of the non-designating parties of any
such designated deposition to file any objection or counter-designation within seven days after the proponent’s designation” and
also “to bring any objections or other unresolved issues to the court
for hearing no later than 5 days before the day of trial.”150 Not only
must the objecting party file its objection, but it must actually set
the issue for hearing as opposed to just preserving objections via
pleadings. This new language pushes back the timeline and allows—or rather forces—the parties (and most importantly the
court) to streamline the issues for trial.
C. Witness Testimony by Audio-Visual Means in Circuit Court
Civil Cases
Effective March 15, 2020,151 the supreme court enacted Rule
1:27, an entirely new rule allowing live video testimony at civil circuit court trials and providing the ground rules for such testimony.152 The rule applies to both party and nonparty witnesses,153
and provides an inexhaustive list of factors for the court in considering a request for live video testimony at trial:
(1) the age of the witness, and whether the witness has any disabilities or special needs that would affect the taking of testimony;

145. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
146. Id. § 8.01-420(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
147. See Lloyd v. Kime, 275 Va. 98, 107–08, 654 S.E. 563, 568–69 (2008).
148. R. 1:18 (App. 3) (Repl. Vol. 2020).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Given the unfortunate effect of the pandemic throughout the Commonwealth on
litigation (and life in general of course), this rule was prescient.
152. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:27 (Repl. Vol. 2020).
153. Id.
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(2) whether translation of the questions or answers may be required;
(3) procedures available for the handling of exhibits;
(4) mechanisms for making and ruling upon objections – both within
and outside the hearing of the remote witness;
(5) procedures for sidebar conferences between counsel and the
court;
(6) mechanisms for the witness to view counsel, the parties, the jury,
and the judge;
(7) practical issues, such as the size, number and location of video
display screens at the remote location and in the courtroom or facility
where the trial or hearing will take place;
(8) whether there should be any requirements for camera angle or
point of view, any picture-in-picture requirements, and/or camera
movement;
(9) how the statutorily required encryption of signal transmission
will be attained;
(10) creation of a record of such testimony; and
(11) any necessary limitations or conditions upon persons who may
be present in the location where the witness testifies, and whether
those persons must be identified prior to the testimony of the witness.154

The rule instructs that a court “should” allow for live video testimony at trial when the parties all agree, the witness is over 100
miles from the court, or with certain witnesses in the medical field
whose duties prevent their attendance in person.155 In other circumstances, a party can still seek leave of court for such remote
testimony, but must move for the court’s permission at least sixty
days prior to trial.156 The other side has only ten days to file an
objection, unless otherwise permitted by the court.157 Interestingly,
the rule contemplates the specific concern litigators have over
video testimony at trial, namely, the jury’s ability to assess the
credibility of the witness, favorably or unfavorably. It specifically
instructs the court to “consider whether the ability to evaluate the
credibility and demeanor of the person who would testify remotely
is critical to the outcome of the proceeding and whether the nonmoving party has demonstrated that face-to-face cross-examination is necessary because the . . . [testimony] may be determinative
of the outcome.”158

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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For nonparty witnesses, the moving party need only demonstrate good cause for allowing remote video testimony.159 However,
for parties and expert witnesses, the moving party must show “exceptional circumstances” to justify video testimony at trial.160 As
always, the testimony must be under oath.161 For witnesses outside
of Virginia there are additional requirements. Before testimony
from a witness who is outside of Virginia can be admitted, the witness must file a notarized consent form agreeing to provide testimony under an oath administered by someone in Virginia; “expressly agreeing to be subject to the penalties of perjury under
Virginia law and subject to court orders by the Virginia judge regarding the testimony”; and “consenting to personal jurisdiction of
the Virginia courts for enforcement of the perjury laws” and related
orders from the judge in that particular case.162
The rule provides that the party seeking to introduce live-video
testimony at trial is responsible for all the costs and logistics of
ensuring that it occurs.163 Notably, a logistical or technical failure
to ensure that the live-video testimony proceeds precludes the testimony and cannot be grounds for a continuance.164 While remedies
for issues outside the control of the parties165 are “within the sound
discretion of the presiding judge,” there is an obvious risk with livevideo deposition testimony that truly requires practitioners to test
the technology and set up thoroughly before the day of trial.166
D. Deposition Attendees, Procedure, and Objections
Rule 4:5 has been amended to clarify procedural issues during
discovery depositions. First, the rule now expressly provides that
only the witness, the parties, counsel of record and relevant staff,

159. Id.
160. Id. However, since most practitioners would agree that having your client present
at trial is paramount, it is hard to imagine seeking such permission absent such circumstances.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. Amusingly, the rule lists a very specific example, “Such as a power outage affecting the Virginia courtroom.” Id.
166. See id.
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and those administering the deposition (court reporters, videographers, etc.) can attend the deposition.167 If a party wants additional
individuals present, she must “timely confer” with opposing counsel regarding such individuals.168 The rule states, “[a] party seeking to exclude any person from attending a deposition—or seeking
authorization for any person to attend a deposition—must move
for an order in the discretion of the circuit court.”169 This phrasing
is a bit odd because it leads with the party seeking to exclude an
individual, and it places the party seeking the additional attendee
in a clause set off by em dashes. From a grammatical perspective,
this puts greater weight, and thus responsibility, on the party
seeking to exclude.170 Because the rule sets the default permissible
attendees, it would be clearer to expressly obligate the party seeking additional attendees (or seeking to exclude statutorily permitted attendees) to seek and receive court approval prior to the deposition. However, the author expects the courts to interpret this
rule consistent with its intent.
Finally, the amendment covers a couple other procedural issues
in depositions. To minimize disputes over who takes lead during a
deposition, the rule now provides that unless agreed otherwise, the
“examination . . . is begun by the party noticing the deposition.”171
The rule also now provides that objections are governed by rule 4:7,
which essentially codifies long-standing practice that objections except for form are not waived if not made during the deposition.172

167. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:5 (b)(4) (Repl. Vol. 2020).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. Especially when you compare this language with the amendment to the uniform
pre-trial scheduling order discussed infra specifying in unambiguous terms that the objecting party to designated depositions has the obligation to file the objection and set the hearing. See infra section III.B.
171. R. 4:5 (Repl. Vol. 2020).
172. Id. (citing R. 4:7 (Repl. Vol. 2020)).

